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The liberal era that began in Central Europe in 1989 has come to an 
end. Populism and illiberalism are tearing the region apart. Hungary is 
in a state of a “cold civil war” between the manipulative postcommunist 
government (one that admitted to lying “in the morning, in the evening, 
and at night”) and the populist anticommunist opposition, which keeps 
its doors open to the extreme right. The Slovak government is a strange 
coalition of Robert Fico’s soft populists, Ján Slota’s hard nationalists, 
and Vladimír Meèiar’s Meciarists—an unimpressive brew of national-
ism, provincialism, and welfarism. In the Czech Republic there is no 
major problem with the government—the only problem is that for al-
most seven months the country’s political parties failed to form a gov-
ernment. In Romania the president and the parliamentary majority are 
engaged in an open war, with secret-police files from the communist 
era and corruption files from the postcommunist era the weapons of 
choice. In Bulgaria extreme nationalism is surging, but the mainstream 
parties and governmental institutions are accommodating it instead of 
fighting it. 
 The capital of Central European illiberalism today, however, is Po-
land. It is currently ruled by a coalition of three parties: the right-wing 
populists of the post-Solidarity Law and Justice party; the postcommunist 
provincial troublemakers of the Self-Defense Party; and the heirs of the 
pre–World War II chauvinist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic groups that 
form the League of Polish Families. This coalition has been characterized 
by its most outspoken critic, editor and former dissident Adam Michnik, 
as employing a peculiar mix of the conservative rhetoric of George W. 
Bush and the authoritarian political practice of Vladimir Putin.1
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 Throughout the region, publics mistrust politicians and political par-
ties. The political class is viewed as corrupt and self-interested. Dis-
satisfaction with democracy is growing. According to the global survey 
Voice of the People 2006, Central Europe, contrary to all expectations, 
is the region of the world where citizens are most skeptical about the 
merits of democracy.2 The picture is bleak and depressing. The liberal 
parties founded by former dissidents have been marginalized,3 the lib-
eral language of rights is exhausted, and centrism and liberalism are 
under attack both as philosophy and as political practice. The new hard 
reality in Central Europe is political polarization, a rejection of consen-
sual politics, and the rise of populism.
 The growing tensions between democracy and liberalism, the rise of 
“organized intolerance,” increasing demands for direct democracy, and 
the proliferation of charismatic leaders capable of mobilizing public an-
ger make it almost impossible to avoid drawing parallels between the 
current political turmoil in Central Europe and the crisis of democracy 
in Europe between the world wars. The specter of populism is haunting 
Central Europe, but there is little agreement about the meaning of the 
term “populism”: Who are the populists? What does populism repre-
sent? How dangerous is it? What are the sources of the current populist 
wave? What should be done about it?
 It is above all the latest political developments in Poland that have 
called up memories of the collapse of democracy in Europe in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Poland has become the symbol of the new political Zeitgeist. 
Freedom House’s new report Nations in Transit 2007 stresses the Polish 
government’s attacks on the independent judiciary and the independent 
Central Bank and its violation of the rights of sexual minorities.4 Mich-
nik sets forth the indictment as follows: 
[I]n the ministries and state institutions, numerous civil servants have been 
summarily replaced by unqualified but loyal newcomers. The indepen-
dence of the mass media—especially of public radio and television—was 
curtailed by changes in personnel instigated by the government and by 
pressures to control the content of what was published and broadcast. The 
Kaczyñski administration’s efforts to centralize power have limited both 
the activities of the independent groups that form civil society and the 
autonomy of local and regional government. The everyday language of 
politics has become one of confrontation, recrimination, and accusations.5
 The public atmosphere in Poland perfectly fits what American his-
torian Richard Hofstadter defined as the “paranoid style in politics.” 
The paranoid style sees evidence everywhere of a vast and sinister con-
spiracy, a gigantic yet subtle machinery of influence set in motion to 
undermine “our way of life.” 
 According to the current Polish government, ex-communists and their 
liberal allies had succeeded in creating a public atmosphere in which Ca-
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tholicism was equated with clericalism; holding to tradition and cultural 
identity was equated with ignorance; and the word “patriotism” was de-
leted from the national vocabulary. The liberal hegemony is blamed for 
destroying the moral community created in the heroic days of Solidarity 
and for legitimizing the economic sway of the former communist elites. 
The Kaczyñski brothers frame the political conflict in Poland these days 
as a clash between their new Fourth Republic and the Third Repub-
lic that prevailed during the years of transition (1989–2005). It should 
not come as a surprise that the issue of lustration has emerged as the 
symbol of contestation between the Liberals’ Third Republic and the 
Kaczyñskis’ Fourth Republic. Liberals insist on individual responsibil-
ity for the wrongdoings of the communist period. They legitimately fear 
that the Kaczyñskis’ version of lustration violates the rights of citizens, 
and the Constitutional Tribunal has affirmed their view. The populists 
appeal not to the rights of individuals but to the rights of the nation. The 
government is prepared to sacrifice the rights of individuals in order to 
restore society’s sense of historical justice. 
 In the eyes of the postcommunist liberals, the populist right has ac-
quired the features of what Umberto Eco calls “eternal fascism.”6 The 
main characteristics of this “ur-fascism” are the cult of tradition and 
the rejection of modernization; irrationalism and anti-intellectualism; 
an appeal to the frustrated middle class; an obsession with conspiracy 
and anti-Semitism; and, of course, fierce antipluralism and antiliberal-
ism. The erratic and confrontational behavior of the Polish government 
during the negotiations of the EU’s new “reform treaty” in June 2007 
contributed to the popularity of the “Weimar interpretation” of the crisis 
in Central Europe.
 But there is a serious problem with this interpretation. While it may 
do a good job of illuminating the confusion and despair of the liberal 
elites, it fails to describe the actual state of affairs. In present-day Central 
Europe, unlike in Europe in the 1930s, there is no ideological alternative 
to democracy. The economies of the countries in the region are not stag-
nating but booming. Standards of living are rising and unemployment is 
declining. The membership of the Central European countries in the EU 
and NATO provides a safeguard for democracy and liberal institutions. 
The streets of Budapest and Warsaw today are flooded not by ruthless 
paramilitary formations in search of a final solution, but by restless con-
sumers in search of a final sale. 
 The Central European paradox is that the rise of populism is an out-
come not of the failures but of the successes of postcommunist liberal-
ism. By presenting their policies not merely as “good” but as “neces-
sary,” not merely as “desirable” but as “rational,” liberal elites left their 
societies with no acceptable way to protest or express dissatisfaction. 
The transition period was marked by excessive elite control over po-
litical processes and by a fear of mass politics. The accession of the 
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Central European countries to the EU virtually institutionalized elite 
hegemony over the democratic process. Parliament lost its function as 
a place where major political debates take place and was reduced to 
an institution preoccupied with adopting the EU’s acquis communau-
taire. Ordinary citizens experienced transitional democracies as regimes 
where voters could change governments but could not change policies. 
As the pop group Maxim + SKIN sings: “We don’t have a choice but we 
still have a voice.”
The Fallacy of Anti-Populism
 In the current Central European debate, “populism” usually refers 
either to emotional, simplistic, and manipulative discourse directed at 
the “gut feelings” of the people or to opportunistic policies aimed at 
“buying” the support of the people. But is appealing to the passions of 
the people supposed to be forbidden in democratic politics? And who 
decides which policies are “populist” and which are “sound”? As Ralf 
Dahrendorf has noted, “one man’s populism is another’s democracy, 
and vice versa.”7 
 Respected political scientist Philippe Schmitter (neither Pole nor 
populist) insists that the rise of populist parties can have a positive im-
pact on the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe.8 He ac-
knowledges the downside of populist parties: They undermine existing 
party loyalties and stable choices between competing partisan programs, 
without replacing them with alternative ones; they recruit ill-informed 
persons who do not have consistent preferences and who seek “emo-
tional” rather than programmatic satisfactions from politics; and they 
raise expectations that cannot be fulfilled. But at the same time, Schmit-
ter argues, populist parties deconsolidate sclerotic partisan loyalties and 
dissolve and open up collusive party systems; they recruit persons who 
have previously been apathetic and passive citizens and mobilize them 
to participate in the electoral process. By raising and combining dispa-
rate or ignored political issues, populist parties encourage the articula-
tion of suppressed cleavages and demands. They challenge “accepted” 
external constraints and call into question existing and often exploit-
ative dependencies upon foreign powers. 
 The recent populist experiences of Slovakia or Bulgaria confirm 
Schmitter’s more balanced and benign view of the impact of populist 
parties on the democratic system. The coming to power of Fico’s gov-
ernment has resulted not in the breakdown of democracy but in increased 
trust in institutions and in the democratic process as a whole. While 
only one in five citizens trusted the previous government of Mikuláš 
Dzurinda, every second Slovak trusts Robert Fico’s populist govern-
ment. Trust in Parliament has also increased. The same could be said 
about the victory of former king Simeon’s movement in Bulgaria. When 
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the ex-king won his electoral landslide in 2001 and formed a govern-
ment, it was feared that his victory represented the end of party politics 
and a rupture with the politics of democratic reform. All these predic-
tions turned out to be dead wrong. At the end of the day, the ex-king’s 
government contributed to the success of the reform process and to the 
consolidation of Bulgarian democracy. In other words, populism has 
distinctive virtues as well as vices, and it is by no means evident that the 
latter always prevail. Populism is antiliberal but it is not antidemocratic. 
It gives voice to the losers of the reform process. To paraphrase what 
James Madison said about factions in Federalist 10, any effort to ex-
clude populists from competition would be worse than the damage that 
they might cause. 
 So, it is fair to say that what we face in Central and Eastern Europe is 
not a crisis of democracy but a profound transformation of democratic 
regimes as a result of the end of the transition. It is antagonism toward 
the politics of the transition period—what we may call “really existing 
liberalism”—rather than toward liberal ideology that is driving the cur-
rent revolt against liberalism in the region. 
 In historical perspective, the transition marked the victory of the 
democratic revolution. Postcommunist societies succeeded in peacefully 
transforming the communist system, building democratic and market 
institutions, producing economic growth, and, finally, in becoming part 
of the European Union. At the same time, the transition led to rapid 
social stratification that painfully hurt many while it privileged a few. 
Many lives were destroyed and many hopes betrayed during the time 
of transition. By the late 1990s, the typical Polish suicide victim was 
not a teenager in an existential crisis, but a married man in his early 
forties living in one of the myriad small towns and villages where the 
bankruptcies of farms and state firms combined with the collapse of the 
old welfare state to produce a particularly searing kind of despair. The 
fact that the major winners of the transition were the educated and well-
connected members of the old nomenklatura did not enhance the moral 
acceptance of the transition. The original sin of the postcommunist de-
mocracies is that they came into being not as an outcome of the triumph 
of egalitarianism but as a victory of an anti-egalitarian consensus unit-
ing the communist elite and the anticommunist counterelite. Ex-com-
munists were anti-egalitarian because of their interests. Liberals were 
anti-egalitarian because of their ideology. 
 The impact of EU accession on the consolidation of postcommunist 
democracies was more ambiguous than some of its advocates are ready 
to admit. The European Union played a key role in securing policy con-
sensus and improving the quality of institutional performance, as well 
as in strengthening local democracy and empowering liberal institutions 
such as the courts and independent central banks. At the same time, 
however, the European Union and the external constrains that it imposed 
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on the accession countries contributed to the perception of the transition 
regimes as “democracies without choices,” and thus fueled the current 
backlash against consensual politics.
Thinking 1968
 There is another analogy that illuminates the recent events in Central 
Europe better than that of the interwar European democracies. It is West 
Germany in 1968 rather than Weimar Germany in 1933 that offers the key 
to understanding the current crisis. Today, as in 1968, the crisis came af-
ter two decades of successful economic recovery and a period of amnesia 
about the past. The turmoil was unexpected and frightening. The crisis of 
democracy in 1968 was rooted not in the failure of democratic institutions 
but in the success of the postwar West German project of modernization 
and democratization. Then, as today, there was a talk about the hollowness 
of democratic institutions and the need for a moral revolution. In Germany 
then, as in Poland now, there were appeals for a “new republic” and a 
rejection of the politics of soulless pragmatism. Then, as now, there was 
a major transformation in the cultural and geopolitical context. The word 
“populism” was in the air, and people demanded more direct democracy. 
 Here, however, the similarities end. What is different about the cur-
rent “populist revolution” is that it is shaped by conservative sensibilities. 
The new self-proclaimed “revolutionaries” in Central Europe fear not the 
authoritarianism of the state but the excesses of postmodern culture and 
the collapse of traditional values. They are nostalgic and not utopian, 
defensive and not visionary. In 1968, the spirit of the times was individu-
alistic, emancipatory, and libertarian. That is not the case today. 
 Now, unlike then, the challenge to the system is coming not from the 
left but from the right, and the new dream is not global solidarity but 
national exceptionalism. The populists of 1968 were “educationalists”: 
They wanted to empower the people as they believed the people should 
be. The populists of today want power for the people as it is. The revolu-
tionaries of 1968 had a passion for “the other,” for those who are not like 
us. The populists of today have a passion for their own community, for 
those who are just like us. In a sense the populist revolution that we are 
witnessing in Central Europe today is a revolt against the values, sensi-
bilities, symbols, and elites of 1968. In the modern age, nothing is more 
revolutionary than what only yesterday seemed the height of reaction.
 Thinking in terms of 1968 tempts us to view the current crisis of lib-
eralism in Central Europe not as a “particular” crisis of postcommunist 
democracies, but as one aspect of the transformation of democracy in 
the European Union as a whole. The heart of the current crisis is not a 
clash of principles that pits democratic majoritarianism as embodied by 
the populists against liberal constitutionalism as defended by the lib-
erals. The heart of the conflict is rather the clash between the liberal 
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rationalism embodied by EU institutions and the populist revolt against 
the unaccountability of the elites. Liberal elites fear that modern societ-
ies are becoming ungovernable. Populists fear that modern elites have 
become totally unaccountable. Both fears are legitimate. 
 The rise of populist parties as a rule invites psychological or even 
psychoanalytical interpretations. Commentators consciously or uncon-
sciously are tempted to analyze populism in terms of “the return of the 
repressed,” “traumas,” “frustrations,” and “status anxieties.” But the 
psychological fashion in interpretations of populism is misleading. What 
we are witnessing today is not pathology but a profound transformation 
in the nature of Europe’s liberal democracies. It is the very structure of 
contemporary democracy that is at issue, rather than a particular mal-
function of an otherwise workable model. 
 The processes of European integration and globalization have pro-
foundly changed the essence of the political in Europe. The Cold War–
era liberal democracies of Western Europe, organized around the antago-
nism between left and right, between labor and capital, can no longer 
serve as a model for Central and Eastern Europe. In the new environment 
of a common European market and global economic competition, deci-
sion making on economic policy has practically been excluded from the 
realm of electoral politics. Despite all the populist rhetoric in Central and 
Eastern Europe, there is very little in the way of populist policies, espe-
cially when it comes to the economy. Even though populist leaders blame 
neoliberal policies for the suffering of the people, they do not seem eager 
to change those policies. The economic approach of the populist govern-
ments in Poland or Slovakia (for the moment, at least) does not differ 
substantially from the policies of their liberal predecessors.
 The decline of the welfare state has resulted in the disappearance of 
the liberal democracies as we knew them. Sociologist David Ost has 
argued that the emerging class conflicts in Central and Eastern Europe 
became articulated as conflicts not about interests but about identity, 
thus fostering an illiberal political culture and the triumph of populist 
parties.9 In order to prevent anticapitalist mobilization, liberals success-
fully excluded anticapitalist discourse, but in doing so they opened up 
space for political mobilization around symbolic and identity issues, 
thus creating the conditions for their own destruction. The priority given 
to building capitalism over building democracy is at the heart of the 
current rise of democratic illiberalism in Central and Eastern Europe. 
The more rational economic policies have become, the more irrational 
electoral politics has grown. The de facto exclusion of economic policy 
from the democratic process, combined with the revolution in media and 
entertainment, eroded the rationalist foundations of liberal policies. 
 The death of the grand ideological narratives and the hegemony of 
“third way” centrism have profoundly transformed contemporary demo-
cratic politics. Elections no longer offer a grand choice between compet-
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ing worldviews; instead they more and more take the form of referenda 
on the elites—the “ritual killing” of the governments in power. Scan-
dals have played a central role in this transformation of the political. As 
Pierre Rosenvallon has put it:
The function of opposition is framed more and more often in terms of 
indictment (on the model of the great English political trials of the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries), eclipsing a vision of politics as the 
rivalry among different programs. The figure of the citizen as a voter is 
today more and more overtaken by the image of the citizen as juror.”10 
 The populists’ obsession with corruption is the most powerful ex-
pression of this new understanding of the meaning of politics. The new 
populist majorities perceive elections not as an opportunity to choose 
between policy options but as a revolt against privileged minorities—in 
the case of Central Europe, corrupted elites and morally corrupting “oth-
ers” such as ethnic or sexual minorities. 
 Populism is no longer merely a feature of certain parties or other po-
litical actors. It is the new condition of the political in Europe. The result 
is a brand of politics where the main structural conflict is not between 
left and right or between reformers and conservatives. The real clash is 
between elites that are becoming ever more suspicious of democracy and 
angry publics that are becoming ever more hostile to liberalism. 
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